As negotiations between Tehran and Washington become increasingly deadlocked in Geneva—largely due to Iran’s categorical refusal to grant the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to facilities damaged during recent military strikes, including Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—the fundamental cause of the current crisis inevitably comes back into focus: The United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under President Donald Trump.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was among the agreement’s most outspoken opponents, devoting considerable political capital to persuading the Trump administration to abandon it. On several occasions, he openly claimed credit for influencing President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the accord in May 2018, arguing that the agreement posed a long-term threat to Israel’s security by granting Iran international legitimacy without permanently dismantling its nuclear infrastructure.
The JCPOA imposed strict limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment, capping it at 3.67%—a level suitable exclusively for peaceful civilian purposes and electricity generation. Following the US withdrawal and the reimposition of sweeping sanctions, Tehran gradually abandoned many of its commitments under the agreement. This process ultimately resulted in uranium enrichment reaching 60% at facilities such as Fordow and Natanz—a level that places Iran technically close to the approximately 90% enrichment generally associated with weapons-grade material.
The decision to withdraw from the agreement without an effective alternative framework proved to be a major strategic miscalculation. It removed significant international constraints on Tehran while providing the Iranian leadership with both the political justification and the technical opportunity to approach nuclear threshold status. Today, this reality constitutes one of the most formidable challenges confronting the ongoing Geneva negotiations. In this sense, it can be argued that Netanyahu contributed more than any previous Israeli leader to creating the conditions that enabled Iran to move significantly closer to a potential nuclear weapons capability.
Tehran now regards the facilities damaged during recent US and Israeli military operations as the very heart of its nuclear program. Consequently, it considers any international inspection of these sites an infringement upon its sovereignty and a direct threat to the technological achievements accumulated through years of advancing uranium enrichment—progress that accelerated dramatically after Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. Iranian officials further insist that both the country’s ballistic missile capabilities and its nuclear program remain outside the scope of negotiations, particularly since the recently signed memorandum aimed at ending hostilities did not explicitly address nuclear disarmament, despite assertions made by some officials in Washington.
Recent statements by US officials, particularly Vice President J.D. Vance, suggesting that Iran had agreed to inspections generated considerable confusion. However, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei categorically denied the existence of any protocol permitting inspectors to enter the damaged facilities, emphasizing that cooperation with the IAEA remains confined to routine safeguards procedures. Meanwhile, American officials continue to signal that alternative options—including the recovery or removal of enriched uranium stored deep underground—remain under consideration should Iran maintain its refusal.
Current developments indicate that Iran’s nuclear file has evolved beyond the realm of technical restrictions imposed by international agreements and has become an integral pillar of the country’s national security doctrine. The extensive body of scientific and engineering expertise accumulated over decades—whose early foundations were reportedly strengthened through technical transfers linked to the proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan—has now become deeply embedded within Iran’s indigenous technological and military establishment. Consequently, attempts to dismantle or eliminate these capabilities through negotiations alone have become extraordinarily difficult and are unlikely to produce definitive results.
Iran’s accumulated nuclear expertise no longer consists merely of centrifuges that can be dismantled or facilities that can be destroyed through military action. Rather, it has evolved into a collective scientific and technological capability that has progressed from technology acquisition to indigenous innovation. Regardless of the guarantees Tehran may eventually offer during the Geneva negotiations, such accumulated knowledge cannot simply be erased. On the contrary, it is likely to continue evolving, particularly within an international environment that increasingly facilitates technological cooperation and scientific exchange beyond the traditional framework of Western oversight.
The recent US-Israeli military campaign has fundamentally reshaped strategic thinking in Tehran. Nuclear deterrence is no longer viewed merely as a bargaining chip or an instrument of diplomatic leverage; it has increasingly come to be perceived as an existential necessity for ensuring the survival of the Iranian state in the face of persistent security threats. Rather than extinguishing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the attacks on its nuclear infrastructure appear to have reinforced the conviction among Iranian decision-makers that the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent encouraged their adversaries to cross previously established strategic red lines.
Accordingly, any arrangements eventually reached in Geneva are unlikely to eliminate Iran’s underlying motivation to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Iranian leaders, mindful of historical precedents involving states that relinquished strategic weapons programs only to find themselves vulnerable, increasingly view abandoning the nuclear option as synonymous with profound strategic exposure. Consequently, Tehran’s current negotiating posture—characterized by tactical flexibility while preserving its core technological capabilities—appears primarily designed to gain time, consolidate its strategic position, and protect the long-term objectives of its nuclear program without compromising its essential foundations.
The evolution of Iranian strategic thinking since 2026 suggests that Tehran has moved beyond merely maintaining a nuclear threshold capability toward embracing the necessity of possessing a credible deterrent. International pressure and verification mechanisms may succeed in slowing technological progress temporarily, but they are unlikely to eliminate ambitions that have become firmly embedded within the broader framework of Iran’s national security doctrine.
Ultimately, Iran’s nuclear program has transcended the traditional framework of technical arms control to become an essential component of the state’s long-term survival strategy. Any agreement reached in Geneva is therefore likely to represent an exercise in crisis management rather than a definitive resolution of the nuclear issue, while Tehran continues to preserve and develop its nuclear capabilities beyond the full reach of international monitoring. The central challenge confronting negotiators lies in transforming temporary understandings into a durable and sustainable agreement. Iran remains determined to separate technical nuclear issues from broader political pressure, whereas Washington seeks to capitalize on recent ceasefire understandings to establish greater oversight over what it regards as Tehran’s expanding nuclear gains.
Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan University
