PAKISTAN has never enjoyed an ideal law-and-order situation. Ethnic conflicts, religiously motivated terrorism, tribal feuds, organised crime, political violence and weak policing have remained persistent features of the state. Over the last three decades, these challenges have evolved into a far more complex security landscape. Urban crime has expanded, organised criminal syndicates have become more sophisticated, terrorism and insurgencies have persisted and criminal and militant economies have increasingly overlapped.
The result is a multidimensional crisis that affects not only citizens’ security but also economic growth, investment, social cohesion and state legitimacy. The most visible deterioration has occurred during the last five years. Major urban centres, once considered relatively insulated from conflict, are increasingly exposed to violent crime, extortion, targeted killings, cyber-enabled criminality and sporadic terrorist attacks. The traditional distinction between militancy and criminality is also becoming blurred as terrorist organisations increasingly rely on criminal networks for financing and logistics, while criminal gangs exploit conflict environments for profit.
Pakistan’s major cities continue to function economically, but perceptions of insecurity are growing. Vehicle theft, abductions, fraud, drug trafficking, sexual violence and organised robberies have become serious concerns. Kidnapping for ransom is again emerging as a significant challenge in Balochistan and KP, while Sindh and Punjab are witnessing similar trends.
At the same time, Pakistan’s policing system remains largely unchanged from the colonial structure inherited at independence. Successive governments have promised police reforms, yet political interference, administrative weakness and institutional neglect have prevented meaningful modernisation. The police continue to function as a political instrument rather than an autonomous public service institution.
Instead of investing in accountable policing, the authorities are relying on coercive legislation.
As political institutions have weakened, civilian law-enforcement agencies have increasingly become subordinate to stronger security institutions. The priorities of these institutions naturally revolve around counterterrorism, insurgency, and national security threats. Consequently, ordinary policing, crime prevention, investigation and community safety receive limited attention.
This imbalance is producing troubling outcomes. Instead of investing in accountable policing, professional investigations and local intelligence systems, governments increasingly rely on coercive legislation. The Punjab Control of Habitual Offenders and Anti-Social Behavior Bill, 2026, is a recent example of this trend. The proposed legislation grants extensive powers to executive committees dominated by police and intelligence officials to monitor, restrict and penalise individuals even without prior criminal convictions.
On one hand, the state seeks greater control over citizens’ social behaviour through expansive legal powers. On the other hand, organised criminal networks continue to flourish in areas such as the riverine belt of Punjab and Sindh, where successive governments have struggled to establish the writ of the state and, at times, have even negotiated with or pardoned criminal actors.
Balochistan presents perhaps the most complex manifestation of Pakistan’s law-and-order crisis. Militant organisations, including Baloch insurgent groups and the TTP, increasingly operate in overlapping geographical spaces despite their divergent ideological and political objectives. Their coexistence is facilitated by informal understandings, parallel economies and the extraction of financial resources, without directly challenging each other.
Quetta has emerged as a particularly vulnerable urban centre. The city remains a target for terrorist and insurgent attacks while simultaneously experiencing the rise of criminal gangs involved in kidnappings, extortion and violent crime. Various perceptions surround these groups, including allegations that some consist of former Afghan security personnel coming here after political changes in Afghanistan. Whatever their origins, these groups have introduced another layer of insecurity in the provincial capital.
Even more alarming is the security situation on highways connecting Quetta to the rest of the province and country. Despite heavy deployment within the city, major roads remain vulnerable to attacks, extortion and other criminal activity. Traders, transporters and mine owners have repeatedly protested against the deteriorating situation, demanding safe movement and effective state protection. The issue has become so serious that members of the provincial assembly have publicly stated that even ministers cannot safely travel to their constituencies.
The merger of the century-old Levies Force into the Balochistan Police represents one of the most significant institutional reforms undertaken in the province. The abolition of the distinction between A and B areas was intended to establish a uniform system of law enforcement and strengthen the state’s writ. However, the transition has also created operational challenges. The Levies possessed deep local roots, intimate knowledge of tribal dynamics and strong community trust. Their disappearance has created intelligence and trust deficits in several rural areas. While the police believe the benefits of the merger will emerge over the longer term, weak institutional capacity, procedural differences, low conviction rates and limited resources have combined to produce temporary governance vacuums.
KP faces a different but equally dangerous situation. Terrorist organisations, including the TTP, IS-K, the Gul Bahadur group, and various criminal networks, have increasingly penetrated urban areas through extortion, targeted violence and digital intimidation. Businessmen, politicians and wealthy individuals in cities such as Peshawar and Swat face extortion demands delivered through internet-based communications from cross-border sanctuaries.
The provincial government has attempted to strengthen specialised police units, expand Safe City projects, and seek additional federal support, but financial constraints continue to limit these efforts.
The experience of Azad Kashmir also offers important lessons. There, the police have mismanaged political and economic protests through coercive means. The excessive use of force, external deployments and the securitisation of political grievances transformed governance disputes into law-and-order crises.
The policy responses must also differ across provinces. Experts argue that in Balochistan, the priority should not be reversing the Levies merger but rather properly localising and civilianising the new policing structure while rebuilding community trust. Punjab requires greater accountability and specialisation within its expanding policing architecture. KP needs a clearer police-military operating framework that defines responsibilities and strengthens civilian law-enforcement capacities. Azad Kashmir requires political dialogue mechanisms to prevent governance disputes from escalating into security crises.
Unless Pakistan places civilian policing and public safety at the centre of its security strategy, the gap between state power and citizen security will continue to widen.
The writer is a security expert.
Published in Dawn, July 5th, 2026
