The signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement left us with a picture of Muhammad bin Salman, de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey, and Shehbaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan, praying together with Mecca in the background. This picture is highly symbolic for Muslim audiences, who make up almost a quarter of the world’s population.
The agreement, which has been dubbed the ‘Islamic NATO’, theoretically brings together Saudi money, the Turkish defence industry, and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and manpower. However, as most analysts have pointed out—including Conor Gallagher on this blog—the agreement is unlikely to yield any real military power in the short term. The main reason is that the three countries’ previous defence agreements, primarily with the U.S., prevent the alliance from functioning independently.
Israeli and Iranian analysts both see this pact as a strategic counterweight to their regional ambitions. This ‘Sunni bloc’ has emerged in response to Israel’s disasters in its neighbourhood, which include the genocide in Gaza, the gradual annexation of the West Bank, and the occupation of southern Lebanon and parts of Syria, among others—basically, the pursuit of the ‘Greater Israel’ project. The pact may attempt to offer a credible front against it, especially if it includes other nations such as Egypt and Qatar.
But it has also been motivated by the emergence of Iran as a regional power—and perhaps an international one. Iran has not only survived a joint attack by Israel and the U.S., but it is also inflicting a strategic defeat on them. This has solidified its regional position and given it the legitimacy to demand concessions, such as control of the Strait of Hormuz. If the momentum of the war continues as it is—and it most likely will—Iran will emerge stronger, albeit more isolated from its immediate neighbours.
This is an outcome that Israel might have been looking to achieve. Tel Aviv would have preferred to break up the country, but in the absence of that scenario, it could not allow the normalization of Iranian relations with other Arab countries. Israel did not fear an isolated Iran, just as it does not really fear the emerging U.S.-aligned ‘Sunni bloc’. But Israel fears an alliance between Iran and its Arab and Sunni neighbours.
That is why Washington has viewed this pact favourably. The three constituent countries, alongside potential future members, are intertwined with the U.S. security establishment and security architecture in the region. In the short term, at least, this pact will work in collusion, or directly in tandem, with U.S. interests—and by extension, with Israeli foreknowledge.
However, that does not mean this pact lacks the potential to become something else. The defence alliance is built on the back of other regional projects. The Hejaz Railway project connects Istanbul with Mecca through Syria and Jordan. The Middle East leg of China’s Belt and Road Initiative would pass through Iran and Türkiye to Europe. The Road Development Project connects the Persian Gulf with Europe. If these and other connectivity and trade networks were to materialize, we might witness the emergence of a new Middle East. Yet, for it to become a reality, Iran has to be an integral part.
This ‘New Middle East’ would not be the one that Netanyahu—and the Israeli establishment—want. That is why they have worked hard to sever ties and prevent the integration of Iran into the region. That was the argument of a paper published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) shortly before the ‘Ramadan War’.
In short, the paper argued that the ‘victories’ the U.S. and Israel were achieving in the region were shifting the balance of power towards Tel Aviv, which was prompting the emergence of a Sunni bloc to counter it. More dangerously, this ‘Sunni bloc’ was ready to cooperate with Iran in order to contain Israel. That could not be allowed. From their point of view, Israel and the U.S. had to attack Iran regardless of the immediate outcome, because it would either break Iran or distance it from its neighbours.
They were not wrong. They have managed to unite three of the most important regional players, but instead of being aligned solely against them, these players are also directed against Iran. They seem to be counting on the—dubious—premise that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” What they did not anticipate is that Iran could emerge stronger, not only as a regional power, but as an ideological one in the minds of many Sunni Muslims.
The U.S. and Israel have achieved something no amount of Iranian propaganda ever could. By standing up to them, Iran has been legitimized in the eyes of many Sunni Muslims. After the havoc created by the U.S. over the decades, the millions of deaths from its senseless wars, and the atrocities committed by Israel—especially the genocide in Gaza—many Muslims see Iran as an avenger. And the Iranians have been clever enough to capitalize on that in their war propaganda.
For example, the Yaqeen Institute, a Sunni Islamic research institution based in the U.S., put out a series of videos explaining the theological and historical differences between Sunnis and Shias. The series received backlash, not only from Shias, but also from Sunnis, leading them to withdraw one of the episodes and offer an apology. The argument was that it contained some mistakes that perpetuated the Sunni-Shia divide. But the underlying sentiment was that it was not the time to delve into the divide, but rather to stand united with Iran.
Another prominent U.S. Muslim scholar, Yasir Qadhi, who was a foremost voice of the Salafi ideology that he has now rejected, held an open dialogue with Shaykh Mahdi Rastani, a prominent U.S.-based Shia scholar. This would not have really been possible if two things had not happened before. On the one hand, Muslims and Islam have become the recipients of much hatred in the West, and, on the other, Iran has been the only country to face the U.S. and Israel while publicly proclaiming to be defending Muslims.
There is, of course, still a lot of resentment in both camps. Many of the recent wars in the Middle East have exploited and encouraged sectarian Sunni-Shia fighting to promote political or geopolitical interests. Israel has done so—as the paper quoted above exemplifies—while despising both. But Iran has gained a new legitimacy. I have met Sunni Muslims who have told me that while they completely reject Shia theology, they were reconsidering their entire political stance based on the Iranian model.
That is the narrative the picture of the three leaders of three of the most important Muslim-majority countries worldwide is trying to counter. By standing together in front of the Kaaba, these leaders are trying to show a united Sunni front that can give them legitimacy to claim they represent almost a quarter of the world’s population. That is not only a religious claim, but a geopolitical one. However, no picture can stand against Iranian missiles.
There will be no geopolitical reality for the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement or a new security architecture in the Middle East if it does not include Iran. I don’t think that a nation-state can embody a religious order—there are two competing claims for sovereignty—and therefore Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and others should put aside their theological differences, fulfill their nationhood claims, and work together for their own benefit.
And I think there is no narrative that can ever be won in the minds of many, if not most, Muslims that does not openly defy Israel and its genocidal policies.
