Within the past several weeks, China has announced a series of initiatives related to planetary defense. At the end of June, it unveiled plans to establish an asteroid early-warning network for planetary defense. A few days ago, China also released further details about its asteroid deflection mission, which has been under development for several years. The mission is currently scheduled for 2027, although the launch date may still change. The mission is expected to involve sending a spacecraft to impact an asteroid in an attempt to alter its trajectory and, potentially, disrupt its structure.
These steps are part of broader long-term plans. In 2018, China joined the International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN) and the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG), both of which operate under the auspices of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. The 2021 Space White Paper elevated planetary defense to one of China’s policy priorities for the coming years, outlining plans to develop a near-Earth object defense system by improving its monitoring, cataloguing, early warning, response, and disposal capabilities.
In 2022, China established the Deep Space Exploration Laboratory (DSEL), which is responsible, among other tasks, for conducting research on planetary defense. DSEL is led by Wu Weiren, one of China’s leading space engineers and the chief designer of the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program. In February 2025, Chinese media reported that the government had opened three new positions for planetary defense experts. The following month, DSEL organized a conference on near-Earth asteroid defense, attended by more than 50 Chinese experts.
Planetary Defense and National Priorities
One may wonder why an authoritarian state such as China is paying increasing attention to planetary defense despite the low probability of a major asteroid impact. This raises the question of what political and strategic objectives these efforts serve.
In a recent peer-reviewed article published in Space Policy, my co-authors and I examined China’s motivations for expanding its role in planetary defense. One important factor is the ambition to build China’s image as a strong space power. In 2022, Xi Jinping stated that “to explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry and build China into a space power is our eternal dream.”
Engagement in planetary defense also enables China to present itself as a comprehensive space power, in line with the vision articulated in its 2016 Space White Paper of becoming “a space power in all respects.” At the same time, because planetary defense is widely perceived as an activity that serves the global public good, China’s growing involvement reinforces its image as a responsible power. In doing so, it aligns with Beijing’s broader narrative of building “a global community of shared future” for all of humanity.
Another important motivation is domestic legitimacy. The national space program serves as a powerful demonstration of China’s global influence and technological capabilities. The government also seems to be responding to public concerns. According to official sources, Chinese authorities announced plans for an asteroid early warning system in 2018 following a fireball that exploded over Yunnan Province in October 2017. Similarly, when state media reported the recruitment of new planetary defense experts in early 2025, they noted that there was “widespread concern on Chinese social media”’ about the possibility of an asteroid impact.
In addition, the development of planetary defense is closely linked to national security and the advancement of military technologies, as many planetary defense capabilities have dual-use applications. In 2017, Xi Jinping said that “integrated military and civilian development should be implemented in the fields of sea, outer space, cyber space, biology, and new energy.” In 2020, the National Development and Reform Commission identified space infrastructure as an example of a platform for military-civil fusion.
The military is regarded by experts as the main actor controlling China’s space program. In 2024, China established the Aerospace Force as one of the seven main branches of the People’s Liberation Army, with responsibility for military space operations.
By investing in planetary defense, China can also promote its technologies internationally and support technology exports. For example, BeiDou, China’s alternative to GPS, was initially developed for military purposes but was later promoted for civilian and commercial applications. BeiDou is now used by governments and companies around the world.
China’s Own Experts Warn of Gaps in Its Planetary Defense
However, China’s planetary defense capabilities continue to face significant limitations. Compared with the United States, China remains less technologically and institutionally developed in this field and has been relatively reluctant to share information with international partners. An example is the above-mentioned recently announced asteroid early-warning network. It remains unclear whether the proposed network will incorporate dedicated space-based monitoring assets or rely on existing satellite infrastructure. It is also unknown how the network will be institutionally governed or to what extent it will share information with international partners.
China’s limitations in contributing to global planetary defense have been acknowledged even by Chinese experts, including Wu Weiren himself. In a 2022 article, of which Wu was a co-author, the authors argued that “China has low international contribution and influence in the field of planetary defense.” They noted that, of the approximately 40,000 near-Earth asteroids identified worldwide at the time, only 32 had been discovered by a Chinese observatory. They recommended that China play a more active role through United Nations mechanisms, participate in international coordination frameworks and expand data sharing.
This article was not an aberration. For several years, Chinese experts have engaged in an active debate criticizing the country’s limited preparedness and calling for better coordination and greater international engagement in planetary defense.
Even domestically, China’s planetary defense program is institutionally fragmented. Although the China National Space Administration (CNSA) is often presented as China’s equivalent of NASA, it has relatively limited authority. Decision-making involves numerous government and semi-government agencies, the military, state-owned enterprises, and, ultimately, the Chinese Communist Party, which retains final decision-making authority. The institutional framework remains opaque and lacks effective coordination.
One of the principal limitations is that space policy, including planetary defense, is regarded as a matter of national security and military affairs, and as such, it is inherently characterized by a high degree of secrecy and limited transparency. Another factor limiting information sharing with foreign partners is the increasingly repressive environment under Xi Jinping. Regulations such as the Data Security Law (2021) and the Counter-Espionage Law (2023) impose strict penalties for sharing information related to national security.
China is likely to continue strengthening its planetary defense activities as it advances several of Beijing’s strategic objectives simultaneously. It supports China’s ambition to become a leading space power, reinforces its image as a responsible international actor, contributes to domestic legitimacy, and accelerates the development of dual-use technologies. However, China’s planetary defense program is likely to prioritize high-visibility projects and technologies with clear strategic or dual-use value over less visible forms of scientific research and international cooperation.
At the same time, the close integration of planetary defense with China’s national security and military establishment, together with opaque governance structures and restrictive information policies, is likely to continue limiting Beijing’s contribution to global planetary defense efforts.
